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Small arms and light weapons are the primary cause of death in the violent conflicts raging 
today, but the small arms trade is difficult to track, and the illicit trade in small arms is doubly so. 
Nevertheless, information is available and research institutes like the Small Arms Survey and the 
Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers are at the forefront of efforts to collect and 
distribute this information. This paper focuses on the illicit arms trade and draws on a database I 
am developing, the Illicit Arms Transfer Database, which systematizes information contained in 
journalistic reports on illicit small arms transfers. This and previous studies, which employ some 
basic tools of social network analysis (SNA), reveal high profile positions occupied by former 
Soviet bloc countries in the illicit arms trade network. I set up this analysis with discussion of the 
features of social networks that allow them to facilitate the transfer of illicit weaponry, and 
follow the presentation of my findings with some explanations for the prominence of Russia and 







FORMER SOVIET BLOC LOCALES IN 
AFRICA’S ILLICIT ARMS TRADE NETWORK 
 
 
Despite the downward trend in the total dollar value of the arms trade since the end of the cold 
war, there is no such trend in the international transfer of small arms and light weapons (SALW). 
Comprehensive and reliable longitudinal data on the volume of the SALW trade are only now 
becoming available, but developments over the past two decades point to an increase in the flow 
of this type of weaponry. The proliferation of low-intensity warfare, conflicts in which SALW 
figure prominently, is a source of increased demand, while stocks of military surplus created by 
the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union vastly increased supply. 
Light weaponry continues to be produced—by an expanding number of manufacturers, many of 
them driven to export in order to achieve economies of scale—and some of this is added to the 
second-hand equipment circulating in today‘s war zones. 
 Of this trade in SALW, the value of which has been estimated at roughly $4 billion per 
year, probably 10-20 percent occurs in the black and gray markets.
1
 Information about the illicit 
arms trade abounds, particularly in the form of investigative journalism and reports on the field 
activities of nongovernmental organizations involved in small arms control and disarmament. 
Although much of this information has been gathered, collated, and examined by researchers in 
the academic and activist communities, systematic data collection and analysis has yet to proceed 
very far. Data collection itself is a formidable task. Aside from the obvious difficulty deriving 
from the efforts of black marketeers to keep their activities out of view, the variety of actors, 
locales, equipment, and forms of transaction involved in the illicit arms trade presents a major 






being made and it is not too early to begin mapping the structure of black market transfers of 
SALW. 
 I do three things in this paper. First, I discuss illicit arms trafficking in the context of 
social networks. Scholars who have examined social networks as distinctive forms of 
organization offer insights that I find useful for understanding the illicit arms trade, the role of 
social capital in the functioning of these trafficking networks, and their resiliency despite the 
efforts of militaries and law enforcement to curtail this lethal trade. Second, I make use of some 
descriptive procedures, from among a set of quantitative and visual tools known as social 
network analysis (SNA), to illuminate some of the structural features of the illicit arms trade to 
Africa. For this purpose, I employ data drawn from an evolving database I have been assembling 
on illicit arms transfers worldwide. Finally, because former Soviet bloc countries appear to be 
prominent in the illicit arms trade, I consider some of the explanations that have been offered to 
account for this and other transnational criminal activity. I also offer some concluding 
observations on the challenges of data collection for systematic research on the illicit arms trade. 
 
Supply of Illicit Arms 
Virtually all illicit arms transfers are SALW, and in this category of armament researchers 
generally include pistols, rifles, assault rifles, carbines, machine guns, hand-held and mounted 
grenade launchers, portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, portable missile launchers, and small 
caliber mortars. In any given geographic space, the stock of illicitly acquired weaponry may 








 Weapons may leak from government stocks because they are either stolen and sold. In 
the context of domestic unrest, armories and ammunition depots are often the target of raids by 
rebel fighters.
3
 Government arms shipments are susceptible to interception in transit as well. Of 
course, the vulnerability of government stocks to theft is a function of the regime‘s capacity to 
guard weapons facilities and its legitimacy in the eyes of the guardians. Not all theft is the 
consequence of overwhelming force deployed by raiding parties; military or security personnel 
may offer various levels of assistance, even by simply looking the other way, when their 
allegiances or sympathies begin to lean away from the sitting government. Soldiers, police, or 
other officials may be similarly motivated to sell the arms at their disposal, but typically these 
illicit sales are driven by personal gain, or just necessity borne of dire economic circumstances. 
Lastly, because taking up arms against the government is illegal, weapons captured from 
government forces during the course of battle are also gotten illegally. 
 Most illicit weaponry was legally produced; it is only later that laws are broken by virtue 
of the manner in which possession has been transferred from one party to another. However, in 
areas of persistent conflict, illicit local production may emerge to help meet the high demand for 
small arms and explosives. Much of this takes place in private workshops or residences and is 
best characterized as craft production. As governments almost never sanction this sort of local 




 Illegally obtained weapons are often shipped across state borders. But not all illicit arms 
transfers start as leakages from the government arsenals of the exporting state. Governments 






from the standpoint of domestic laws operating in the destination country and, arguably, 
international law as well.
5
 Clearer violations of international law are arms transfers undertaken, 
authorized, or otherwise facilitated by governments that nevertheless contravene UN-imposed 
arms embargoes. These, along with sanctions-busting arms shipments by nonstate actors, 
whether motivated by political or economic considerations, add to the stock of illicit weaponry 
within a geographic locale.
6
 
 For an illicit arms transfer to be completed, three types of actions must occur. First, the 
arms must become available for transfer, through any of the sources mentioned above (leakage 
from government arsenals, illicit craft production, etc.). Second, they must be transported from 
one state locale to another. And third, they must be collected by the recipient. An actual 
sequence of events may be (and typically is) complicated in various ways—for example, by the 
involvement of multiple brokers, transporters, and transshipment points—but these are the most 
basic components. The failure of any one of these components will thwart the transfer, and each 
is the target of those wanting to address the problem of illicit arms transfers from the supply side. 
 Against this seeming vulnerability is the fact that there are multiple sources and parallel 
transfer channels available to arms traffickers, which makes supply-side approaches to arms 
control extraordinarily difficult, not least because transfers move through two or more state 
jurisdictions, as well as possibly ungoverned areas like the high seas or territories of failed states. 
As Markowski et al. conclude, ―The odds are clearly in favor of illicit arms users and suppliers 
who, given the scope for channel redundancy, can easily tie the sources of supplies to their illicit 











Illicit Arms Trafficking 
Small arms transfers may be, essentially, economic transactions, but they are often transactions 
governed by more than market forces. State-sanctioned transfers are typically elements in an 
ongoing military relationship between governments. Illicit transfers, while also driven on the 
supply side by both economic and political consideration, may further require a degree of trust 
and shared commitment to an underground system of exchange. It is, of course, common to refer 
to the trade in illicit weapons as a black market, but the transnational flow of these goods is 
affected by a wider range of political, ideological, and/or ethnic factors than other illicit flows, 
like narcotics. It is useful, therefore, to contrast pure market transactions with transactions in 
other organizational contexts, namely, social networks. 
 
Markets and Social Networks 
A market is a social entity that governs transactions between producers and consumers by way of 
a price mechanism, and economists typically locate pure markets at one end of a range of 
possible arrangements for the exchange of goods and services. This is the anarchic end. No 
authority is exercised in a pure market; economic production is governed by prices, which result 
from individual decisions affecting supply and demand. At the hierarchical end are organized 
social entities like firms. Within a firm, economic production is governed by an entrepreneur, 






organization. One of the questions that has occupied economists is: under what circumstances do 
markets give rise to hierarchical organizations as a means of coordinating economic exchange? 
 The classic treatment of this issue is by Coase, who maintained that ―the operation of a 
market costs something and that, by forming an organization and allowing some authority (the 
‗entrepreneur‘) to direct the resources, certain marketing costs are saved.‖
8
 In contemporary 
scholarship, these sorts of costs are termed ―transaction costs,‖ and they generally derive from 
the inefficiencies associated with incomplete information.
9
 Some economic transactions involve 
uncertainties—e.g., about continued access to specialized inputs into the production process—
and although these might be handled by entering into contracts, the continual negotiation and 
renegotiation of contracts is costly. Such transaction costs, at least some of them, can be 
eliminated if the parties enter into an exchange relationship governed according to the bylaws of 
a hierarchical organization. Under these circumstances, firms will realize efficiencies not 
available in the open market and economic production and exchange will become more 
profitable.  
 Patterns of economic exchange governed by more than market forces but by less than 
hierarchical organizations have been of considerable interest to sociologists. Granovetter, for 
instance, has echoed the common criticism of the neoclassical economic approach to 
organization as offering a utilitarian and ―undersocialized‖ conception of human action in which 
little allowance is made for the impact of social relations on economic exchange (except as a 
drag on the efficient allocation of resources). At the same time, early sociological correctives 
tended to propose ―oversocialized‖ conceptions of behavior whereby individuals simply, and 








 For Granovetter and others, economic behavior is governed not only 
by institutional arrangements designed to discourage malfeasance and reduce transaction costs, 
or by a ―generalized morality‖ instilled through the socialization process, but also by trust. 
Economic action is embedded in ongoing social interaction and more emphasis needs to be 
placed on ―the role of concrete personal relations and structures (or ‗networks‘) of such relations 
in generating trust and discouraging malfeasance.‖
11
 
 Much of the sociological research that has been done on interpersonal relations in 
economic life focuses on the creation and maintenance of social networks. Less anarchic than 
markets, networks of actors are at the same time not hierarchically organized. Where price serves 
as a control mechanism in markets and authority serves that function within a vertically 
integrated firm, personal relationships, typically characterized by trust and a norm of reciprocity, 
are the glue that binds a social network together. Under conditions more conducive to social 
networks, hierarchically organized social entities may not be required as a means of reducing 
uncertainty and managing transaction costs.
12
 What are those conditions? To what extent can 
they be explained by the social, cultural, and political practices that embed economic interaction? 
Alternatively, to what extent can they be explained by the nature of particular forms of economic 
exchange? 
 Powell addresses the last of these questions, maintaining that some forms of exchange are 
inherently more social than others. They depend not so much on formal authority, but on shared 
interests and ongoing relationships. In network forms of exchange, ―the entangling of obligation 
and reputation reaches a point that the actions of the parties are interdependent.‖ The pattern of 






no common household, no pooling of assets.‖
13
 Whereas market transactions are undertaken to 
maximize returns in the short and medium term, network exchanges are sequential and contribute 
to an overall pattern of enduring interaction. When the exchange of goods or services is 
facilitated by trust or a sense of obligation, network forms of organization function well when 
composed of homogenous groups of actors. The opportunism and guile contributing to high 
transaction costs in the impersonal market setting is less common among those sharing 
professional, ethnic, or ideological backgrounds, and thus hierarchical governance structures are 
less likely to emerge. 
 
Trafficking and Illegal Markets 
The social network concept is proving useful in the analysis of ―dark networks‖—adversarial 
networks, like terrorists organizations or insurgencies, and criminal networks engaged in various 
forms of illicit trafficking. Law enforcement and national security policymakers, in particular, 
have been interested in understanding the features of these dark networks that allow them to 
adapt to a changing environment, including efforts by police and military forces to defeat their 
activities and dismantle their organizations. Scholarship in sociology, economics, criminology, 
and political science is contributing to this understanding and providing a set of analytic tools to 
describe social networks, both their resiliencies and vulnerabilities.
14
 
 Social capital—which I will define here as resources residing in the interaction of 
multiple actors that enable the creation of either private or collective goods—is as important to 
the goals of those comprising a criminal network as it is to members of Rotary International, a 
microfinance cooperative, or the local bowling league.
15






organizational forms most conducive to the generation and distribution of social capital. Indeed, 
social networks would seem to be most important to those engaged in activities that must remain 
underground and beyond the reach of legal contracts and other regulatory mechanisms that attach 
to open market exchange. Family ties, personal friendships, shared ethnicity and religious 
belief—these give rise to interpersonal loyalties and the trust that reduce transaction costs when 
the rule of law is unavailable. While this sort of social capital is not absent from commerce in 
open markets, it becomes rather more essential to the movement of illicit goods.
16
 If nothing else, 
suppliers, traffickers, and consumers must instill confidence among themselves that they share a 
commitment to keeping the joint enterprise hidden from scrutiny by the agencies of government. 
About the illicit arms trade, Naylor says that ―discretion is a proverb, not only with respect to 
one‘s own business but with respect to everyone else‘s as well. By an unwritten code, 
gunrunners, however anxious to cut each other‘s commercial throats, rarely rat out each other.‖
17
 
 Bruinsma and Bernasco have examined three criminal groups whose activities have two 
important features in common with illicit arms trafficking other than the need to operate 
underground. Heroin smuggling, human trafficking, and the transnational trade in stolen cars (i) 
serve a market and (ii) involve the movement of illegal goods and services across long distances. 
One of the preliminary conclusions of the study was that activities characterized by higher levels 
of criminal and financial risk require collaboration grounded on substantial mutual trust, which is 
most likely to be a feature of cohesive social networks. In the case of heroin smuggling, the 
riskiest of the three criminal enterprises examined, that cohesion derive from ethnic 






Netherlands) and those that work most closely together at the different stages of the process 
further tend to be of similar age and social class, and hail from the same regions of the country.
18
 
 It is hard to say whether, in terms of risk, the illicit arms trade has more in common with 
heroin smuggling or less-risky trafficking in humans or stolen automobiles. Nor are my data 
sufficiently fine-grained to allow me to illuminate the degree of ethnic, religious, or ideological 
cohesion—and, by extension, trust—present in illicit arms trade networks. But, as a hypothesis, 
it is reasonable to posit that illicit arms networks that operate in higher risk environments—for 
example, in geographic locales with a robust police and/or military presence, or spanning long 
distances with multiple sites of potential vulnerability—are composed of a more socially 
homogeneous membership. The social cohesion created by ethnic, religious, or ideological bonds 




Mapping the Illicit Arms Trade 
Curwen‘s examination of illicit arms transfers to Liberia provides a good illustration of the 
application of social network analysis (SNA) in an effort to identify key actors and their 
placement in these underground networks.
20
 Based on UN reports documenting arms embargo 
violations, Curwen identifies the individuals and transactions involved in four arms-transfer 
events occurring between 1999 and 2002. All together, 38 individuals comprise the nodes of this 
network—brokers, transportation agents, buyers (including Liberian President Charles Taylor 
himself and his son, Chuckie), and so on. The 78 ties between the nodes are operationalized as 
the presence of contractual, business, or employer-employee relationships between individuals. 
This illicit arms transfer network is depicted in Figure 1.
21






according to role) and ties—called a ―sociogram‖ or ―network graph‖—we get a good sense of 
network structure and the most connected individuals. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 Social network data are arranged as a square ―sociomatrix‖ in which there is both a row 
and a column for each node in the network. A cell in the matrix contains a 1 if the actor 
represented by row i, designated ni, had a relationship with the actor represented by column j, 
designated nj, in which case xij = 1; otherwise xij = 0. Curwen‘s data are nondirectional in that a 
tie between two nodes represents a relationship rather than a sent or received communication or 
other exchange; thus, xij = xji. But in other SNA applications to the study of illicit arms transfers, 
it may be useful to consider directional ties. In this case, an actor‘s outdegree, d(ni), is the 
number of other actors to whom that actor has directed some form of communication or 
exchange (for example, delivered weapons); indegree, d(nj), is the number of actors from whom 









jij xnd )( , (1)  
which are, respectively, the row i and column j totals of the sociomatrix. If there are s actors in 
the network, the maximum number of directed ties between them is s(s − 1). 
In most social networks, certain actors are more prominent than others and the evidence 
of their prominence is often the number and type of social ties they maintain with other actors. 
The centrality of a network actor is sometimes indexed as its outdegree or indegree (or both), but 
since these measures are greatly affected by the number of actors in a network, it is useful to 































jD . (2) 
Again, because Curwen‘s data are nondirectional—the sociomatrix is symmetric—the formulas 
in (2) give the same result. Figure 2 arranges the nodes so that the actors with the highest 
centrality measures are positioned nearer the center of five concentric rings, while those with 
lower scores are positioned nearer the periphery. Not surprisingly, the most central actors in the 
network examined by Curwen are Charles Taylor, whose three-and-a-half year trial before the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone has just concluded, and Viktor Bout, the high-profile Russian 
arms broker and transporter now in U.S. custody on conspiracy charges. Also centrally located in 
the social network are Pavel Popov (Russian) and Sanjivan Ruprah (Kenyan), both involved in 
Bout‘s air transport operations. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 Visual inspection of Figures 1 and 2 suggest that nodes in a network may also be 
important to the extent that they are positioned between two other nodes. In the case of the illicit 
arms trade, when one actor, ni, has links to two others, nj and nk, which are not linked directly, ni 
may serve as a conduit for the transfer of arms from nj to nk. Such actors are located on the 
shortest paths, or geodesics, connecting nj and nk. Thus, another measure of centrality, 
betweenness centrality, starts with the number of geodesics, gjk, linking nodes j and k, and the 
number of these that contain node i, gjk(ni). Betweenness can be measured as the sum of the 


















This measure is at its maximum when node i is located on all geodesics in the network. Not 
including node i, there are (s − 1)(s − 2) possible directional links, and half that number of 














CC BB . (4) 
Not surprisingly, in the illicit arms network serving Liberia, Viktor Bout has the highest 
betweenness centrality score, based on Curwen‘s data. As is evident in Figure 3, except for 
Charles Taylor, all of those with the highest betweenness scores are either brokers or transport 
agents, which is what we would expect this measure to show. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
A closely related SNA concept useful for the study of illicit arms trade networks is 
―brokerage.‖ Brokers, in network analytic terms, are nodes positioned on a directional path 
between nonadjacent nodes. Naturally, they tend to have high betweenness scores. Social 
network analysts have gone on to specify particular brokerage roles based on the actors‘ 
membership in groups or other attribute categories. For instance, a node occupies a ―coordinator‖ 
role when it is interposed between nodes within its same group or organization; when the three 
nodes are members of different groups, the broker acts as a ―liaison.‖ Other brokerage roles are 
defined when the broker and one actor are members of one group and the other actor is a member 
of a second group: brokers that mediate inflows into their group are ―gatekeepers‖; those that 
mediate outflows from their own group are ―representatives.‖ Identifying important brokers in a 
social network involves counting the number of triads in which that node is positioned as an 






two are coded (a priori) by Curwen as either arms brokers or transportation agents.
22
 These are 
precisely the sort of intermediaries we want the analysis to identify. 
 
Illicit Arms Transfers Database 
The Illicit Arms Transfers Database (IATD) is an evolving dataset consisting of information 
gleaned from news and other reports of illegal arms shipments crossing interstate borders. The 
goal is to systematize the large amount of information that exists about the international black 
market in armaments so that some of these data might be subjected to social scientific analysis. 
The Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT), affiliated with the 
International Peace Research Institute in Oslo, maintains an Internet database consisting of tallies 
of state-to-state transfers of small arms and light weapons. The primary focus of NISAT‘s data 
collection efforts is the legal trade in SALW. But NISAT also maintains a ―Black Market File 
Archive,‖ a collection of news stories and investigative reports on the illicit arms trade. These 
accounts, which range widely in content and format, are collated into country folders based on 
the locale of the events described therein. NISAT obtains reports from multiple news 
organizations, as well as other organizations providing information on the black market arms 
trade. These reports provide the raw information upon which the IATD is built. 
 The unit of observation in the IATD is an illicit arms transfer ―event,‖ defined as 
coterminous with a particular arms shipment‘s journey from source to recipient, possibly 
intercepted along the way. Each record in the database consists of data describing that event, 
including the actors and locations involved in the shipment=s journey from originator to recipient 






descriptors and can be grouped as they pertain to (a) the source of the arms shipment, (b) those 
involved in the arms deal, (c) the characteristics of the arms shipped, (d) the journey that the 
shipment took after leaving the source, and (e) the shipment‘s destination. Table 1 shows the 
categories of variables in the database and summarizes the type of information collected in each 
category. The table does not list every variable in each category—for example, actors like 
originators, recipients, dealers, etc., are also accompanied by information regarding their location 
and type—but it does indicate the range of information that the IATD must incorporate in order 
to capture the complexity of many illicit arms-transfer events. At present, there are over 60 
variables in the database used to describe characteristics of different types of illicit transfers, 
although most records are missing data for many of these variables simply due to the paucity of 
information on black market transactions.
23
 
[Table 1 about here] 
The stories and reports collected by NISAT vary widely in the amount of useful 
information they contain. Some articles include detailed accounts of arms shipments from 
manufacturer to purchaser, including any number of participating intermediate dealers, brokers, 
and shipping agents.
24
 Other reports include no codable event information at all. Some reports 
provide a wealth of background information, like previous events in ongoing arms-supply 
relationships. Others pick up a particular shipment‘s journey midstream, as when one military 
organization supplies another organization, without any indication of where the first group 
acquired the weaponry. Even when reports contain complete information, the events themselves 
exhibit a wide range of forms. There is substantial variation in the number and type of 






certificates, arsenal theft, etc.), and whether transfers were intercepted by state authorities or 
someone else other than the intended recipient. The appendix provides an example of the way 
events described in an article from NISAT‘s Black Market File Archive are coded for purposes 
of inclusion in the IATD. 
 A major aim of the IATD Project to this point, one that has largely been achieved, has 
been to develop a data structure that can accommodate the variety of forms that an illicit arms 
transfer event may take.  The set of coding rules has evolved over the course of the Project‘s 
lifespan (about four years) and has proven workable as a methodology for processing thousands 
of articles to date. So far, the Project has examined about 6,800 articles from NISAT‘s Black 
Market File Archive, retrieving about 3,300 events. 
 
Illicit Arms Transfers to Africa 
The informational requirements for the present analysis are minimal. Nodes in this network are 
operationalized as the state locales from which, to which, or through which illicit weapons 
shipments have moved. Once the IATD is cleaned and cross-checked, the database will allow 
researchers to operationalize network nodes as actors—suppliers, recipients, brokers, etc.— 
involved in these transactions, with locale simply being one of their attributes, but a more refined 
analysis along these lines is not advisable given the IATD‘s present state of development. Here 
state locales are shown as nodes in the network if they were involved in at least one illegal arms 
transfer during the 1995–2005 period, the time span for which data have been coded, and if there 






database does contain a large number of additional descriptors, no other information is used for 
present purposes. 
Figure 4 maps state locales (grouped by geographic region) involved in illicit arms 
transfers ultimately arriving in Africa. This network consists of 80 nodes (labeled with three-
letter country codes) and 270 links. As with the network of individuals involved in illicit arms 
transfers to Liberia, the most prominent state locales in Africa‘s illicit arms trade can be 
identified by examining centrality scores. Figure 5, like Figure 2 above, places the most 
connected nodes at the center, but in this case the data are directional and the positioning is based 
on outdegree centrality scores. Thus, the figure identifies the most prominent exporter locales.
25
 
It is noteworthy that several former Soviet bloc countries appear rather central in Africa‘s illicit 
arms trade: Russia (RUS), Ukraine (UKR), Bulgaria (BGR) and, to a somewhat lesser extent, 
Romania (ROM), the Czech Republic (CZE), Belarus (BLR), and Slovakia (SVK). The next 
section considers some explanations for their centrality. South Africa (ZAF) is also central in the 
illicit arms trade to other African countries, and West European countries—Belgium (BEL), 
Britain (GBR), and France (FRA)—are important locales as well. The United States (USA) is 
also a significant locale, but perhaps not as central as we might expect given it predominance in 
the international arms trade generally. 
[Figures 4 and 5 about here] 
 
Illicit Arms Transfers and the Former Soviet Bloc 
Several factors have conspired to make individuals and organizations in Russia and other former 






explanations focus on the role of Russian military and security forces, especially the incentives 
and opportunities associated with the political-economic transition that accompanied the end of 
the cold war. The dismantling of the formidable Soviet-era military-industrial complex was 
remarkable, and attendant dislocations have been documented by both insiders and outside 
observers.
26
 Among the outcomes were decommissioned weapons stocks, mothballed or 
underutilized military production facilities, and an uncertain future for many military and 
security personnel. Whether motivated by economic desperation or opportunism, many of the 
latter had access to post-cold war arms surpluses. They also had access to military transport 
facilities or found common cause with others who had logistical expertise and experience 
moving cargo surreptitiously. As Turbiville observed, ―crime and corruption in the wake of 
Soviet dissolution quickly began to shape and influence every dimension of state and private life. 
Military establishments in the region—shrinking, impoverished, and demoralized—were far 
from immune to these pressures, and in the case of the Russian armed forces in particular, have 
become major participants in the illegal diversion of weapons as well as being profoundly 
affected by crime in other ways.‖ Illicit arms trafficking and other crime had become 




 The former-Soviet arsenal was also hemorrhaging in the periphery. The phased 
withdrawal of Soviet armed forces from central and eastern Europe and the Baltic states in the 
early 1990s was, given the immense scale and logistical challenges, generally well managed, but 
huge volumes of weapons were moved rather quickly and inevitable leakages probably left large 
numbers of SALW in the wake.
28






Russia (namely, Chechnya) and in the post-Soviet states of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan—
increased the demand for arms and presented Russian soldiers, whether deployed to put down 
rebellions or as peacekeepers, with opportunities to acquire much-needed cash. Violent conflicts 
elsewhere, like Moldova and Tajikistan, witnessed similar patterns. And it is well to note that 
this did not start with post-cold war deployments; Soviet military personnel returning from 
Afghanistan in the 1980s also sold arms and ammunition to make ends meet.
29
 
 Although research on the illicit arms trade has devoted more attention to Russia than to 
other former Soviet bloc countries, the analysis presented in this paper also highlights the 
prominence of eastern Europe. Phythian suggests that the same factors were at work: ―Post-
communist eastern Europe remains the prime source for black market small arms. Controls are 
weak and easily evaded, corruption is rife, and financial rewards are far in excess of the meagre 
salaries of most east European munitions workers or officials.‖
30
 In the case of the Balkans, 
however, where the Yugoslav wars were fed by both the import and internal trafficking of illicit 
weapons, Arsovska and Kostakos suggest that the outflow of arms, even with the end of the 
conflicts, has been less pronounced than we might expect given the volume of illicit stocks 
circulating in the Balkans. They attribute this in part to the very high internal demand for arms 
driven by cultural factors and a historical distrust of state institutions; these social forces seem to 
trump an economic logic that would otherwise point to a substantial post-conflict expansion of 
arms exports in the face of excess supply.
31
 I note here that my analysis of illicit arms transfers to 
Africa suggests that former Yugoslav states are not as prominent as Russia and other eastern 






 In addition to the factors already discussed relating to the post-cold war dislocations 
experienced by militaries defense-industrial institutions in former Soviet-bloc countries, part of 
the explanation for their role in the illicit arms trade probably connects to their communist 
legacy. The inadequacies of central planning to direct resources so as to meet consumer demand 
were apparent long before the end of the cold war. Thus, ―economies of favors‖ developed 
whereby needs were satisfied by way of personal connections and informal networks of 
exchange.
32
 Such transactions were not at all rare and were not limited to party functionaries or 
other members of the political elite, nor were they regarded as illegal or illicit by the many rank 
and file who participated in them. Starting with this description of behavior under communism, 
we might hypothesize that post-communist illicit arms trade was able to draw participants from a 
population not unaccustomed to satisfying demand through social networks operating in the 
shadows of officially sanctioned practice. The argument has been put forth by Cheloukhine about 
Russian organized crime generally: ―The growth of the shadow economy was the main catalyst 
forming organized crime. Racketeering, robbery, and other crimes were dangerous but 
predominantly secondary [during the Soviet era]. The roots of the Russian mafia lie in the 
innermost depths of the Russian shadow economy.‖
33
 This is not to suggest that everyone who 
participated in the shadow economy is a potential arms trafficker, only that command economies 
nurtured individuals and networks that were well-positioned to take advantage of the forces of 








The illicit arms trade shares some important properties with networked forms of organization 
studied by sociologists. The complex and convoluted nature of black market arms transfers suits 
this realm of the arms trade especially well to investigation as a social network. Like any 
underground activity involving the exchange and transport of contraband (drugs, counterfeit 
currency, humans), the illicit arms trade operates within an informal organizational environment. 
The forces of supply and demand are mediated by the forces of trust, loyalty, and mutual 
commitment that govern the flow of information and material within a social network. 
 Since my dataset on the illicit arms trade are still at an early stage of development, the 
analysis in this paper employs only descriptive methods designed to explore the main structural 
features of social networks. The results are not definitive, but they are suggestive. The black 
arms market appears to be structured as a scale-free network, even when the network nodes are 
operationalized fairly crudely as state locales. The locales occupying central position in the 
network readily stand out. Among the countries where illicit arms shipments originate, former 
members of the Soviet bloc appear central, whether as weapons sources or as conduits linking 
other locales in the network. One explanation for their prominence in Africa‘s illicit arms trade 
might be found in the availability of cold war surplus and a black market infrastructure nurtured 
originally by their communist economic systems. This, at least, is a reasonable working 
hypothesis for subsequent empirical research. 
 The utility of SNA methods (or any other quantitative methods) for illuminating the illicit 
arms trade obviously hinges on the quality of data that can be collected. Mapping the structure of 






the actors involved. What we do know about it is due mainly to the perseverance of enterprising 
activists and investigative reporters and, as with any data source, this information is subject to 
measurement error and selection bias. The analysis of network dynamics often requires fairly 
complete information about nodes and links, particularly if the aim is to model network 
vulnerabilities. If the lack of information makes it necessary to restrict analysis to sampled data, 
important elements of the network structure may be missed. However, this danger should be less 
pronounced when examining scale-free networks because even incomplete information is likely 
to identify the most prominent nodes.
34
 That is, the same feature that makes these networks 
robust in the face of random failure also makes them more visible in the face of systematic 
efforts to reveal them. If I am right that the illicit arms trade is a scale-free network, then the fact 
that some of it remains hidden from view need not prevent us from mapping its basic structure. 
 More sophisticated SNA methods will become useful as our data collections improve. 
Rather than simply identifying actors and locales in the illicit arms trade, it will become possible 
to model the linkages among them as a function of factors on both the supply and demand side. 
The role of ongoing conflict, social and economic deprivation, weapons surpluses, criminal 
networks, and other conditions conducive to proliferation have been highlighted by small arms 
researchers and activists. The cause of arms control will be advanced to the extent that we can 
identify the most important forces driving proliferation, especially those that are most subject to 
policy intervention and manipulation, and the actors and locales that figure prominently as hubs 
in the arms supply network. When resources are scarce and attentions divided, efforts must be 







Appendix: Coding Example 
 
Coding text-based accounts of illicit arms transfers is a labor intensive task. Researchers have 
made considerable progress in the development of automated coding algorithms for the creation 
of events data in other areas of international relations research, which has drastically reduced the 
time and labor required to generate reliable data suitable for analysis. However, descriptions of 
arms-transfer events are typically too complex to parse with the software available at this time. 
But as further progress is made on the machine coding of international events, new opportunities 
may become available for automated coding of these events as well. 
 What follows is an example of an article appearing in NISAT‘s Black Market File 
Archive, and descriptors for two arms-transfer events identified from this account and entered 
into the IATD. The article is from Haarretz, the Israeli daily, and was distributed by the U.S. 
government‘s Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). 
 
Israeli Businessmen Suspected of Selling Arms to Angolan Rebels 
 
The United Nations is checking suspicions that Israeli firms and businessmen traded in arms and diamonds with 
UNITA rebels in Angola, in violation of the sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council. The impression of UN 
officials is that the Israeli Government is not very keen to cooperate in the investigation and is making no 
efforts to track down the suspects. A special monitoring committee set up by the Security Council in recent 
weeks approached the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem via Israel's UN Ambassador Yehuda Lancry.  
 
At the center of the investigation is Starco Investment and Trade of 13 Martin Buber St. in Haifa. The firm is 
suspected of having bought weapons for $156,000 from Romtechnica, Romania's government arms company, 
in March 1996. According to the end-user certificates obtained by Ha'aretz, the final destination of the 
shipment was Togo's armed forces in the capital of Lome.  
 
The shipment, flown aboard a cargo plane of the Bulgarian airline Avia-Service, consisted of 2,000 Kalashnikovs 
and pistols. However, the bill of goods stated that the shipment consisted of "technical equipment." A larger 
arms shipment from Romania to Togo three years later was again described as "technical equipment." This 
shipment included 40 RPG launchers and huge quantities of ammunition. The deal totaling $0.5 million was 
mediated by East European Shipping Corporation, a firm based in the Bahamas and represented in Europe by 
Trade Investment International Limited, with an address in Britain. This shipment was transported aboard 
Coraca, a ship flying a Panamanian flag and headed for Lome. A check by the UN investigators, assisted by 












Originator: Romtechnica  
     locale: Romania 
     type: state manufacturer 
Recipient: UNITA 
     locale: Angola 
     type: insurgent group 
Dealer: Starco Investment & Trade 
     locale: Haifa, Israel 
     type: private company 
Shipping Agent 
     East European Shipping Corp. 
          locale: Bahamas 
          type: private company 
     Trade Investment International Ltd.  
          locale: Great Britain 
          type: private corporation 
Transporter: Coraca  
     home: Panama  
Illegality 
     sanctions violation: UN 
Arms Shipped 
     type: RPG launchers 




Originator: Romtechnica  
     locale: Romania 
     type: state manufacturer 
Recipient: UNITA 
     locale: Angola 
     type: insurgent group 
Dealer: Starco Investment & Trade 
     locale: Haifa, Israel 
     type: private company 
Illegality 
     sanctions violation: UN 
     license violation: end-user certificate 
Arms Shipped 
     type: Kalashnikovs, pistols 
     price: $156,000 
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Figure 5     Africa‘s Illicit Arms Trade: Exporter Centrality 
 
